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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the empirical support behind the idea that there is a trade-off between the 
size of the migrant population and the rights and entitlements enjoyed by immigrants. We first 
look at the empirical correlation between measures of migrants’ rights and the size of the stock 
of immigrants in a number of existing databases. Using data on migrants’ rights from three 
recent studies—the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Migrant Accessibility Index, the Migration 
Policy Group and British Council’s Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) and the Human 
Development Report Office’s Migrant Entitlements and Services Index—we fail to find a 
systematic correlation of any sign. We then turn to regression analysis using OLS and 
instrumental variable techniques and again fail to find evidence in favor of the existence of a 
correlation. The numerical magnitudes of the correlations suggest a quantitatively small 
relationship which in several cases is positive rather than negative. 
 
Keywords: migration rights and entitlements, measurement, migration data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 
1.  Introduction 
In recent years, a lively discussion has emerged in academic and policy circles regarding the re-
lationship between the magnitude of immigration flows and the expansiveness of the welfare 
state. A position that has emerged in the literature postulates the existence of a negative relation-
ship between the number of migrants and the rights that can be accorded to them (see, among 
others, Ruhs 2009, Ruhs and Martin 2008, Carens 2008, Bell and Piper 2005, and Martin 2004). 
This conclusion is usually justified by an appeal to either rudimentary economics or a basic polit-
ical economy argument. The main proponents of the numbers versus rights hypothesis emphasize 
the former: ―more rights for migrants typically mean higher costs‖ (Ruhs and Martin 2008, p. 
251). In other words, the rising labor costs associated with increasing entitlements lower em-
ployer demand for unskilled labor. Supporters of the political economy position, in contrast, as-
sert that the contributions of unskilled migrants to the welfare system are unlikely to cover their 
costs. As a result, voters and/or policymakers are less willing to pay for the fiscal burden gener-
ated by high entitlements to migrants if their numbers are large.
1
 
 
If there does indeed exist a numbers versus rights trade-off, there are significant normative im-
plications that arise for policymaking. In particular, such a trade-off can be used to justify the 
imposition of severe restrictions on migrants’ rights in developed countries in order to signifi-
cantly improve the capabilities of very large numbers of individuals. By accepting regimes in 
which migrants have few rights, it can be argued, developed countries could accept much larger 
inflows of migrants, offering them significantly higher levels of income, health and education 
than they have in their home countries. It is possibly even the case that the restricted rights of 
migrants in such a regime would still be superior to those that they would have in their country 
of origin. This reasoning is indeed implicit in the argument made by many scholars in favor of an 
expansion of temporary worker programs in the United States (see, for example, Pritchett 2006 
and Portes 2007). 
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 The political economy form of the hypothesis seems intuitively more plausible. Given the magnitude of interna-
tional differences in wages between developed and developing countries, which appear to be on the order of three to 
one after controlling for selection bias (see Clemens, Montenegro and Pritchett, 2008), entry restrictions rather than 
entitlements would appear to be the primary determinant of the price of immigrant labor. In other words, policymak-
ers can choose almost any level of immigration by lowering entry barriers while guaranteeing migrants a regime of 
rights and entitlements which is at least as generous as that accorded to natives. That they may not do so in practice 
appears to be an issue of the determination of political economy equilibria. 
 The numbers versus rights trade-off is often illustrated with reference to the countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), a set of rich resource-abundant economies which are also characte-
rized by significant labor shortages. These countries have very high levels of immigration: for-
eign nationals account for between 26 and 81 percent of their population. They also offer signifi-
cantly reduced rights to migrant employees, including effective prohibition of family visas, no 
opportunity to obtain permanent residence, and conditionality of legal status on maintaining a 
work relationship with the employer requesting the immigration permit (Ruhs 2009, pp. 14-17). 
 
While the GCC case is interesting and suggestive, it may be of questionable relevance for poli-
cymakers in developed countries—to which the numbers versus rights hypothesis is often 
posed—deciding whether to lower barriers to immigration. Assuming that the observation of the 
GCC countries with high numbers and restricted rights tells us something about the choice open 
to developed countries implies a judgment that the political and economic systems of authorita-
rian Middle Eastern regimes are sufficiently comparable to those of Western democracies so as 
for it to make sense to try to understand them within the framework of the same model. Howev-
er, the authoritarian nature of the GCC regimes makes it easy to imagine that the rights regime 
accorded to migrants—or to women or political dissidents—is largely independent of their num-
ber, with the latter being driven largely by economic considerations such as the extent of labor 
shortages. Furthermore, the GCC countries may simply be an outlier in a world in which in-
stances of low levels of immigration and low levels of rights of migrants are also common. 
 
This paper looks more broadly at the evidence regarding the numbers versus rights hypothesis by 
analyzing the sign and significance of the correlation in a number of existing databases. The in-
dices under study include samples that cover both developed and developing countries—the 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s Migrant Accessibility Index and the Human Development Report 
Office’s Migrant Entitlements and Services Index—as well as one focused solely on developed 
countries—the Migration Policy Group and British Council’s Migrant Integration Policy Index 
(MIPEX).  
 
We begin with an analysis of all three indices using migrant stock data from UNDESA (2009). 
We then turn to higher quality datasets from the OECD which allow us to disaggregate by mi-
grant characteristics to perform a more comprehensive examination of the hypothesis. After-
wards, we carry out a series of regressions—using both stock and flow data—to see if the pattern 
of correlations remains after controlling for basic variables. To overcome the evident limitation 
in trying to evaluate the numbers versus rights theory by the use of simple cross-national correla-
tions, we use the predicted share of immigrants from a gravity model to give us a purely exogen-
ous variation in the foreign labor force. As we will show, these tests do not on the whole support 
the existence of a numbers versus rights tradeoff in immigration policy. 
 
This paper is divided into four sections including this introduction. In section two, we provide a 
description of the data and section three presents the results. The main conclusions of the analy-
sis are summarized in section four. 
 
2.  Data 
 
We examine the numbers versus rights hypothesis using two sets of data. The first set consists of 
indices that evaluate unique aspects of migrants’ rights and is described in section 2.1. The 
second consists of migrant stocks and flows, which is discussed in section 2.2. 
 
2.1  Indices  
 
The first index that evaluates migrant’s rights is the Migrant Accessibility Index, which is part of 
the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2008 Global Migrant Barometer. The overall model assesses 
three broad issues across 61 developing and developed countries, including attractiveness to mi-
grants, need for migrants and accessibility for migrants. The latter component measures ease of 
entry, integration and legal environment for migrants on a scale of 0-100 where 100 = extremely 
open. Specifically, the Migrant Accessibility Index evaluates: public attitudes towards migrants, 
trade union power, de jure and de facto discrimination towards migrants, official migration poli-
cy, ease of hiring foreign nationals, licensing requirements for migrants, ease of family reunifica-
tion and official programs to integrate migrants.  
 The second index is the MIPEX, which is produced by the Migration Policy Group and British 
Council. It measures policies to integrate migrants in various EU and non-EU member states and 
creates a picture of migrants’ opportunities to participate in the mainly European societies. The 
MIPEX was created in 2004 and initially covered the EU15.
2
 In 2006, however, the MIPEX was 
expanded to include all 25 EU member states as well as three non-EU countries.
3
 The most re-
cent edition is comprised of 140 policy indicators focused on six areas, which include: long-term 
residence, family reunion, access to nationality, political participation, anti-discrimination and 
labor market access. Each of the policy areas is scored on a scale of 0-100,
4
 where 100 is the best 
practice, and the average of the six areas is converted into an aggregate score. 
 
The Migrant Entitlements and Services Index is the final migrants’ rights index under study, 
which is part of the Human Development Report Office’s 2009 Migration Policy Assessment. 
HDRO staff, together with national migration experts and the International Organization for Mi-
gration, carried out a survey across 20 developing and developed countries to evaluate openness 
to immigration, enforcement of immigration policies, and services and entitlements offered to 
immigrants. The latter component included ratings for preventative and emergency health care, 
public schooling, unemployment benefits, union membership, family allowances and voting 
rights for permanent, temporary and undocumented migrants. The survey responses were care-
fully cross-checked with national documents and legislation, and countries were scored on a 
scale of 0-100 where 100 = immediate, full rights without restrictions for all services across all 
migrant groups.
5
 
 
2.2 Foreign-born Populations  
 
                                                          
2
 The EU15 refers to the EU member countries prior to the accession of the ten candidate countries in 2004 and 
includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
3
 The 25 EU member states include the EU15 plus Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lavtia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The three non-EU countries also covered by the MIPEX are Canada, 
Norway and Switzerland. 
4
 The point systems and policy areas slightly differ for MIPEX versions 2004 and 2006. For comparative purposes, 
we adjusted the 2004 scale to 0-100. Moreover, the political participation policy area was not used in 2004, so the 
2004 aggregate scores reflect the average values of the other five policy areas. 
5
  See Human Development Report Office (2009a) for details. 
Apart from the indices, testing the numbers versus rights hypothesis requires data on the magni-
tude of the foreign-born (henceforth FB) population. In our initial analysis of the global country 
samples covered by the migrant’s rights indices, we use the international migrant stock as a per-
centage of the total population from UNDESA (2009). For comparability purposes, our calcula-
tions reflect the stock and population figures for the average of the 2005 and 2010 values be-
cause the data is only available in five-year increments.
6
 Moreover, since the numbers versus 
rights hypothesis is largely predicated on labor-driven migrants, international refugees were re-
moved from these calculations. 
 
We then utilize two unique databases from the OECD. The first is the Database on Immigrants in 
OECD Countries (DIOC), which provides us with the FB population as a percentage of the total 
population in the year 2000 for 28 OECD countries.
7
 This database is distinctive from the other 
OECD database described below because it is based on the 2000 round of censuses which offers 
detailed information about the immigrant populations. Restricting the FB data by age, country of 
origin and education allows us to estimate the 15 and over FB populations from developing 
countries with low levels of formal education as a percentage of the total population.
8
 By doing 
so, we control for skilled migrants and capture an approximate value for economically active 
unskilled migrants from developing countries that live in selected OECD countries. This is prob-
ably the most adequate measure for evaluating the numbers versus rights hypothesis because the 
theory is most commonly applied to unskilled migrant workers who face the greatest restrictions 
in terms of admissions policies in developed countries. Importantly, all FB figures from this da-
taset are based on country of residence. 
 
The second source of foreign population information from the OECD is the International Migra-
tion Database (IMD). This database furnishes us with the FB population as a percentage of the 
                                                          
6
 All of the correlation and regression exercises were also carried out using the migrant stock values for 2005 and 
2010. However, the different base years did not impact the results, so we present the average values from circa 2008 
for overall consistency with the indices. 
7
 The DIOC provides data for the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United 
States. 
8
 For purposes of this paper, a migrant with a low level of formal education is one who has acquired post-secondary 
non-tertiary education or less (i.e., any education below a category five level as defined by the International Stan-
dard Classification of Education). 
total population for 21 countries
9
 in the year 2006.
10
 In contrast to the DIOC database, the IMD 
has the advantage of being based on more recent information which is closer to the time at which 
most of our immigration policy variables are measured. It also has flows and not just stocks data. 
However, the IMD database has certain limitations. Unlike the DIOC, the IMD consists of total 
populations covering all age groups—not just 15 and older—and immigrant information is de-
rived from an array of sources, including population registers, residence permits, labor force sur-
veys and censuses. As in the DIOC, we are able to restrict the data by country of origin to meas-
ure the foreign citizens from developing countries, but regrettably this cannot be extended to the 
unskilled.  
 
3.  Results 
 
3.1  Correlation Analysis 
 
The correlation results for the complete country samples for all of the indices under examination 
together with the 2008 population and FB stock data from UNDESA are presented in Table 1 
below. The following trends are observed: essentially zero correlation between higher Migrant 
Accessibility and MIPEX aggregate scores and higher percentages of FB in the respective popu-
lation samples (ρ= 0.00 and 0.03), and a moderate negative correlation between higher Migrant 
Entitlements and Services aggregate scores and higher percentages of FB (-0.34). 
 
While the global samples provide little support for the numbers versus rights hypothesis in gen-
eral, perhaps more revealing are the results when restricting the country samples. In the case of 
the MIPEX, higher rights for developed OECD countries coincide with higher mean percentages 
of FB in the population when compared to the rest of the world, contradicting the numbers ver-
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 The IMD provides data for the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germa-
ny, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
10
 We use the FB populations defined by nationality to capture foreign citizens or, in other words, those migrants 
who are not afforded the rights of nationals in the host countries in which they reside. The alternative is to use the 
FB population defined by country of birth as is the only option in the DIOC. This latter concept, however, may in-
clude persons born abroad who retain the nationality of their country of origin. As a result, some of the FB counted 
under this definition may be entitled to the full rights of national citizens and hence should not be included in the 
analysis of migrants’ rights. 
sus rights hypothesis.
11
 The other indices, conversely, suggest just the opposite, with the rest of 
the world having higher mean percentages of FB in their populations and lower rights when 
compared to developed OECD countries. However, this difference is largely driven by the inclu-
sion of the GCC countries. If we omit the GCC countries, the comparison between developed 
OECD countries and the rest is clear cut: across all three indices, developed countries have high-
er numbers and higher migrant rights. The sensitivity of the correlations to the extreme GCC 
observations is also confirmed by looking at the median FB populations, which are less affected 
by extremes. Here developed OECD countries have on average higher rights and higher median 
FB populations than the rest of the world. In other words, any pattern of negative correlation 
between migrant rights and numbers is completely driven by the GCC observations; even if we 
include them, the global correlation is essentially zero for two of the three indicators considered 
and weakly negative for the third one. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Statistics for UNDESA Migrant Data 
 
Indicator (scale) 
# of  
Obser-
vations 
Correla-
tion 
Mean 
Score 
Mean % 
of FB in 
Popula-
tion* 
Median 
% of FB 
in Popu-
lation 
Migrant Accessibility (0-
100)  
61 -0.003 62.4 12.6 8.1 
MIPEX 2006 (0-100) 28 0.030 54.1 10.7 9.5 
Migrant Entitlements 
and Services (0-100) 
20 -0.336 49.2 13.8 11.0 
* unweighted values 
 
While the cross-country correlations described above challenge the existence of the negative 
tradeoff as posited by the numbers versus rights hypothesis, the UNDESA FB data does not al-
low us to distinguish between migrant types, origins or flows. It could therefore be argued our 
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 Throughout this analysis, we adopt the definition suggested by the Human Development Report Office (2009b) of 
classifying as developed those countries that display a human development index greater than 0.9. 
initial exercise is of limited value. We now turn to the DIOC which enables us to disaggregate 
stock data by migrant characteristics for a more in-depth analysis. 
 
The correlations presented in Table 2 column (a) below reflect the 15 and older FB populations 
as of the year 2000 based on the DIOC. The FB data is limited to 28 OECD countries for which 
the migrant stocks can be disaggregated by country of origin and skill level. This enables us to 
capture the working age unskilled migrants from developing countries—for which the numbers 
versus rights hypothesis is most commonly applied—and empirically test the theory across this 
selected group of countries. 
 
Data from the DIOC provides suggestive evidence of a positive relationship between increasing 
numbers of migrants and rights, although the association slightly weakens when controlling for 
origin and skill level. Overall, there is a strong positive correlation between Migrant Accessibili-
ty aggregate scores and higher percentages of total FB in 27 OECD countries (ρ= 0.59) and a 
weak positive correlation between MIPEX aggregate scores and increasing numbers of total FB 
across 22 countries (0.08). The Migrant Entitlements and Services Index is the only exception to 
this pattern, which results in a moderate negative correlation (-0.25). It should be noted, howev-
er, that this deviation may be attributed to the limited number of observations permitted by the 
datasets—13. The results are similar when restricting the FB populations to migrants who origi-
nated from developing countries. Here, the correlation remains positive for the Migrant Accessi-
bility and MIPEX Indices (0.42 and 0.04, respectively) and—although still negative—becomes 
more positive for the Migrant Entitlements and Services Index (-0.09). Further controlling for 
unskilled migrants from developing countries leads to a moderate positive correlation for the 
Migrant Accessibility Index (0.30) and essentially zero correlation for the other indices (-0.04 for 
both). Annex 1 presents detailed scatter plots for each of these exercises. 
 
Table 2 column (b) below also provides the correlation results using the IMD in the year 2006 
for total migrants and those from developing countries. The findings are in line with the previous 
analysis based on the DIOC. For the Migrant Accessibility Index, there is a moderate positive 
correlation between the aggregate scores and higher percentages of total FB in 20 OECD coun-
tries (ρ= 0.22), which turns weak positive when restricting to the FB from developing countries 
(0.10). For 20 OECD countries and the MIPEX, there is essentially zero correlation between 
both the total and FB populations from developing countries and higher aggregate scores (0.00 
and -0.02, respectively). And while there is a weak negative correlation between the total foreign 
population and Migrant Entitlement and Services aggregate scores (-0.14), this becomes essen-
tially zero when controlling for the migrants from developing countries. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Statistics for OECD Migrant Data 
 
Indicator (scale) 
(a) 
2000 
(b) 
2006 
Corre-
lation 
Mea
n 
% of 
FB* 
Me-
dian 
% of 
FB 
# of 
Ob-
serva-
tions 
Mea
n 
Scor
e 
Corre-
lation 
Mea
n 
% of 
FB*  
Me-
dian 
% of 
FB 
# of 
Ob-
serva-
tions 
Mea
n 
Scor
e 
Migrant Accessibility 
(0-100)  
0.585 9.9 9.5 27 
66.
1 
0.219 5.0 4.7 20 
64.
6 
MIPEX 2006 (0-100) 0.079 
10.
9 
10.2 22 
57.
3 
0.006 6.7 4.9 20 
56.
9 
Migrant Entitlements 
and Services (0-100) 
-
0.257 
10.
0 
9.5 13 
61.
3 
-0.135 5.3 4.8 7 
72.
5 
* unweighted values 
 
Two of the indices—Migrant Accessibility and MIPEX—enable us to carry out additional ana-
lyses using the individual subcomponents and FB information from both OECD databases. The 
results for the Migrant Accessibility subcomponents are presented below in Table 3. As evi-
denced, there is an overwhelmingly positive and significant correlation between all of the sub-
components and the percentage of total FB in the 2000 populations. Also noteworthy is the small 
change in this tendency when controlling for different migrant characteristics. For all three FB 
categories, the correlation is generally strong positive for eight of the nine subcomponents, al-
though this slightly weakens when moving from total FB to unskilled. Moreover, three indicators 
are significant at one percent—including the aggregate score—for total FB, three indicators are 
significant at five percent or higher for the developing country sample, and two indicators are 
significant at five percent or higher when controlling for unskilled migrants. 
 
The results for the 2006 FB data slightly differ but remain positive. Overall, there is a weak posi-
tive correlation between five of the nine subcomponent scores and both categories of FB popula-
tions. In all of the other subcomponents—except for licensing requirements—there is essentially 
a zero correlation, and one subcomponent in each of the FB categories is significant at five per-
cent or higher. As in the case of the 2000 data, the correlations tend to weaken when moving 
from total FB to the FB from developing countries. 
 
Table 3: Summary of Correlations for Migrant Accessibility Subcomponents  
 
Indicator (0-100) 
2000 Correlations 
Mean 
Score 
2006 Correlations 
Mean 
Score Total 
From 
Develop-
ing 
Un-
skilled 
Total 
From 
Develop-
ing 
 Aggregate score 
 
0.585*** 0.424** 0.296 66.1 0.218 0.093 64.5 
1. De jure / de facto dis-
crimination  
 
0.573*** 0.492*** 0.448** 70.4 0.500** 0.344 70 
2. Ease of family reunifica-
tion 
 
0.230 0.138 0.023 62.2 -0.014 0.007 60 
3. Ease of hiring foreign 
nationals 
 
0.244 0.164 0.098 65.9 -0.059 -0.149 64 
4. Government policy 0.376* 0.0205 0.110 66.7 -0.029 -0.009 65 
5. Licensing requirements  -0.050 -0.132 -0.169 60.7 -0.288 -0.564*** 61 
6. Openness of country cul-
ture 
0.297 0.221 0.144 67.4 0.090 0.206 65 
7. Power of trade unions 
 
0.273 0.272 0.236 65.2 0.315 -0.089 64 
8. Integration programmes 0.667*** 0.641*** 0.613**
* 
63.0 0.180 0.180 63 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Unlike the overall positive correlation between the Migrant Accessibility subcomponent scores 
and the DIOC data, the results for the MIPEX subcomponents are ambiguous. Presented in Table 
4 below, there is a general weak positive correlation between four of the seven indicators and the 
total FB populations. The correlation strengthens when restricting for the FB from developing 
countries—five out of seven subcomponents—and subsequently weakens for unskilled migrants 
where just one of seven are positive. In this latter category, however, there is a moderate nega-
tive correlation in just two instances—long-term residence and family reunion—whereby all of 
the other correlations are essentially zero (-.06 and below). As in the Migrant Accessibility sub-
components, the correlations tend to weaken when increasingly restricting the FB populations. 
Also meriting notice is the fact that none of the correlations are statistically significant. 
 
The results for the MIPEX subcomponents and the 2006 FB data are similar to those just de-
scribed. Here, there is a slight positive correlation between the total FB populations and four of 
the seven MIPEX subcomponents, which weakens to two of seven when controlling for migrants 
from developing countries. In the latter FB categories, however, the negative correlations are 
essentially zero apart from access to nationality and anti-discrimination, and none of the results 
are significant. 
 
Table 4: Summary of Correlations for MIPEX Subcomponents 
 
Indicator (0-100) 
2000 Correlations 
Mean 
Score 
2006 Correlations 
Mean 
Score Total 
From 
Developing 
Unskilled Total 
From 
Developing 
 Aggregate score 0.079 0.037 -0.037 57.3 0.006 -0.024 56.9 
1. Long-term resi-
dence 
-0.322 -0.262 -0.275 60.7 -0.362 -0.048 61.4 
2. Family reunion -0.121 -0.131 -0.213 58.4 -0.166 -0.047 58.2 
3. Access to natio-
nality 
0.170 0.041 -0.068 47.4 0.032 -0.234 46.1 
4. Political partici-
pation 
0.284 0.228 0.240 53.5 0.350 0.020 54.6 
5. Anti-
discrimination 
-0.004 0.026 -0.064 62.0 -0.156 -0.235 60.0 
6. Labor market 
access 
0.059 0.019 -0.042 62.7 0.004 0.320 61.5 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
3.2  Regression Analysis 
 
The small number of observations using the three indices and the 2000 FB data (n=27, 22 and 
13, respectively) prevents us from carrying out a full-fledged regression analysis. However, it is 
still useful to see whether the pattern—or lack of pattern—of correlations remains when control-
ling for some of the most evident determinants of migration flows. In Table 5 below, we study 
the effect of the aggregate index scores on the total FB, the FB from developing countries 
(FBDEV) and the unskilled FB from developing countries (FBUNS) as dependent variables. In 
addition to the composite scores of the three indices, the controls include the log of income per 
capita in the year 2000 the log of the country size in square km and the log of the weighted dis-
tance in km to the nearest developing country.
12
 When controlling for these, the coefficient ap-
pears to be moderately positive for the Migrant Accessibility Index and weak negative for the 
MIPEX and Entitlements and Services Indices on the aggregate level, which weakens in all cases 
when further restricting the FB data. Moreover, the coefficient is statistically significant in only 
one of the specifications—column (a). 
 
Table 5: OLS Results for all Indices 
Variable 
Migrant Accessibility MIPEX Entitlements and Servic-
es (a) 
FB 
(b)  
FBDEV 
(c) 
FBUNS 
(d) 
FB 
(e)  
FBDE
V 
(f) 
FBUN
S 
(g) 
FB 
(h)  
FBDE
V 
(i) 
FBUN
S 
Aggregate score 0.39 0.129 0.07 -0.057 -0.039 -0.034 -0.199 -0.019 -0.034 
 
(2.70)*
* 
(1.42) (0.92) (0.57) (0.6) (0.63) (0.83) (0.14) (0.36) 
Log of income per 
capita 
7.58 5.784 4.694 8.827 5.289 4.879 13.794 7.912 6.352 
 
(2.52)*
* 
(3.05)*
** 
(2.98)*
** 
(1.87)* (1.69) (1.90)* (2.18)* (2.33)*
* 
(2.60)*
* 
Log of country size 
(km²) 
-0.356 0.472 0.269 0.18 0.656 0.269 1.084 1.713 1.038 
 
(0.44) (0.92) (0.63) (0.18) (1.01) (0.5) (0.42) (1.24) (1.04) 
Log of dist. to poor 
country 
1.98 -0.234 -0.437 2.806 0.471 -0.155 -0.155 -1.936 -1.988 
 
(1.24) (0.23) (0.52) (1.39) (0.35) (0.14) (0.04) (0.97) (1.39) 
Constant -
101.98
6 
-
65.921 
-48.255 -97.842 -56.789 -45.486 -132.29 -82.966 -58.184 
 
(3.34)**
* 
(3.43)*
** 
(3.02)*
** 
(2.16)** (1.89)* (1.84)* (3.14)** (3.65)*
** 
(3.56)*
** 
Observations 27 27 27 21 21 21 13 13 13 
R-squared 0.56 0.44 0.35 0.42 0.29 0.23 0.65 0.71 0.7 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
This same exercise was also carried out across the Migrant Accessibility and MIPEX subcompo-
nents. While the independent variables were unchanged, the dependent variable was restricted to 
the FBUNS.
13
 As presented in Tables 6 and 7 below, the coefficient is positive for six of the nine 
Migrant Accessibility subcomponents and negative in all seven of the MIPEX subcomponents. 
                                                          
12
 Income per capita and country sizes are based on the World Development Indicators (WDI), and the bilateral 
weighted distances to the nearest developing countries are derived from the Centre D’Etudes Prospectives et 
D’Informations Internationales (CEPII). 
13
 Similar results characterize the exercise with FB and FBDEV. These results are available from the authors upon 
request. 
In the MIPEX, however, the coefficient is very far from statistical significance in all the specifi-
cations (t-statistics are uniformly below one), and the absolute value of the coefficient estimate 
tends to be very low. Moreover, in only one instance is the coefficient for any of the subcompo-
nents significant at conventional levels—the exception being column (i) in the Migrant Accessi-
bility Index. By contrast, between one-third and one-half of the cross-national variation in the 
dependent variable is due to changes in levels of income, land area and distance to poorer coun-
tries. 
 
Table 6: OLS Results for Migrant Accessibility Subcomponents 
 
Variable 
Migrant Accessibility Subcomponents 
(a) 
Agg. 
Score 
(b) 
Dis-
crimina-
tion 
(c) 
Ease of 
fam. 
reu. 
(d) 
Ease of 
Hiring 
(e) 
Govt. 
policy 
(f) 
Licens-
ing re-
quire. 
(g) 
Cultural 
open-
ness 
(h) 
Union 
power 
(i) 
Integra-
tion 
prog. 
Subcomponent score 0.07 0.091 -0.025 0.088 -0.007 -0.015 0.054 0.041 0.065 
 
(0.92) (1.54) (0.65) (1.7) (0.23) (0.35) (1.08) (0.98) (2.11)*
* 
Log of income per 
capita  
4.694 3.732 4.966 5.846 4.956 4.769 5.136 4.779 2.389 
 
(2.98)*
** 
(2.21)*
* 
(3.14)*
** 
(3.66)*
** 
(3.07)*
** 
(2.94)*
** 
(3.28)*
** 
(3.06)*
** 
(1.27) 
Log of country size 
(km²) 
0.269 0.617 0.501 0.336 0.417 0.349 0.29 0.381 0.425 
 
(0.63) (1.46) (1.11) (0.86) (0.94) (0.82) (0.7) (0.94) (1.12) 
Log of distance to 
poorer  
-0.437 -1.112 -0.24 -0.466 -0.286 -0.213 -0.332 -0.384 -0.603 
 
(0.52) (1.16) (0.29) (0.59) (0.34) (0.25) (0.41) (0.47) (0.78) 
Constant -
48.255 
-
40.162 
-
49.096 
-
61.925 
-48.67 -
45.947 
-
52.778 
-
48.963 
-25.01 
 
(3.02)*
** 
(2.47)*
* 
(3.03)*
** 
(3.57)*
** 
(2.96)*
** 
(2.64)*
* 
(3.21)*
** 
(3.07)*
** 
(1.35) 
Observations 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
R-squared 0.35 0.39 0.34 0.41 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.36 0.44 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  
 Table 7: OLS Results for MIPEX Subcomponents 
 
Variable 
MIPEX Subcomponents 
(a)  
Aggre-
gate 
score 
(b)  
Long-
term 
resi-
dence 
(c)  
Family 
reunion 
(d)  
Access 
to natio-
nality 
(e)  
Political 
part. 
(f)  
Anti-
discrim. 
(g)  
Labor 
market 
access 
Subcomponent score -0.034 -0.043 -0.046 -0.017 -0.028 -0.008 -0.001 
 
(0.63) (0.65) (0.99) (0.29) (0.9) (0.23) (0.04) 
Log of income per capita  4.879 4.85 4.234 4.488 5.965 4.716 4.815 
 
(1.90)* (1.89)* (1.64) (1.6) (2.09)* (1.80)* (1.83)* 
Log of country size (km²) 0.269 0.246 0.461 0.19 0.169 0.24 0.211 
 
(0.5) (0.46) (0.8) (0.36) (0.32) (0.44) (0.39) 
Log of distance to poor 
country 
-0.155 -0.353 -0.139 -0.091 -0.322 -0.291 -0.346 
 
(0.14) (0.34) (0.13) (0.06) (0.31) (0.27) (0.32) 
Constant -45.486 -43.013 -40.488 -42.085 -54.925 -44.065 -44.799 
 
(1.84)* (1.73) (1.65) (1.59) (2.04)* (1.76)* (1.76)* 
Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.21 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
An objection to the foregoing analysis is that migrant stocks, determined by decisions that mi-
grants may have taken several decades previous to the date at which it is measured, may be very 
imperfect indicators of the interrelationship between migration and highly changing legal and 
institutional frameworks. It is therefore interesting to analyze the numbers versus rights hypothe-
sis using migrant flow data from the IMD instead of stocks. For this exercise, we restrict the in-
flow data to those migrants originating from developing countries and carry out several regres-
sions using the Migrant Accessibility and MIPEX Indices.
14
 The first regressions—in columns 
(a) and (b)—regress the inflow of FBDEV in the year 2006 for 23 and 18 OECD countries, re-
spectively, on the levels of the Migrant Accessibility and MIPEX Indices. The resulting coeffi-
cient is effectively zero for both indices (0.01 and 0.00), but in neither case is it significant at 
conventional levels. Columns (c) through (i), on the other hand, present a specification in which 
the percentage change of the inflow of FBDEV in the total population is regressed on the corres-
                                                          
14
 This was not carried out using the Migrant Entitlements and Services Index due to the limited number of observa-
tions yielded by the datasets. 
ponding percentage change of the MIPEX subcomponent scores between 2004 and 2006. Here, 
the coefficient is positive in six of the seven subcomponents, two of which are significant at ten 
percent—long-term residence and access to nationality. Note that this is arguably the cleanest 
specification that we present in this paper, as it differences out country-specific effects. 
 
Table 8: OLS Results for Migrant Flow Data 
 
Variable 
2006 Percentage Change between 2004 and 2006 
Mi-
grant 
Access 
MI-
PEX 
MIPEX Policy Areas 
(a) 
Aggre-
gate 
(b) 
Aggre-
gate  
(c)  
Aggre-
gate 
(d)  
Long-
term 
res. 
(e)  
Family 
reu-
nion 
(f)  
Access 
to natl. 
(g)  
Politi-
cal 
part. 
(h)  
Anti-
discr. 
(i)  
Labor 
market 
access 
Component score 0.011 0.001 - - - - - - - 
 
(1.56) (0.12) - - - - - - - 
Percentage change in 
score 
- - 1.915 1.994 1.028 1.401 - -0.112 0.929 
 
- - (1.84) (2.14)
* 
(1.06) (2.01)
* 
- (0.1) (0.85) 
Log of income per capita  0.117 0.161 56.27
4 
15.08
9 
78.62
6 
41.25
8 
- 13.09
2 
53.43
4  
(0.76) (0.66) (0.63) (0.19) (0.68) (0.49) - (0.12) (0.48) 
Log of country size 
(km²) 
-0.001 0.044 0.761 18.18
6 
-0.639 6.614 - 2.751 -6.43 
 
(0.03) (0.84) (0.06) (1.31) (0.04) (0.54) - (0.16) (0.36) 
Log of distance to poorer 
country 
0.012 0.001 14.72
4 
17.98
4 
19.94
4 
-2.023 - 21.78
5 
18.09
3  
(0.16) (0.01) (0.61) (0.8) (0.73) (0.08) - (0.72) (0.63) 
Constant -1.624 -1.883 -640.8 -449.5 -899.2 -438.7 - -291.2 -568.7 
 
(1.06) (0.8) (0.64) (0.48) (0.71) (0.46) - (0.24) (0.47) 
Observations 23 18 11 11 11 11 - 11 11 
R-squared 0.22 0.13 0.41 0.48 0.23 0.45 - 0.08 0.18 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Since our regression analyses use a maximum of 27 observations, it may be objected that it is 
unreasonable to expect a strong statistical association to emerge in such a small sample size— 
although it is interesting to note that the income controls are in several cases statistically signifi-
cant. One may thus argue that it makes most sense to concentrate on the point estimates of the 
above regressions as indicators of our best guess as to the magnitude of the potential effect. To 
follow up on this argument, let us consider the point estimates of what are arguably our most 
reasonable specifications, from columns (c), (f) and (i) of Table 5. The coefficients—0.07 for 
Migrant Accessibility, -0.03 for MIPEX and -0.03 for Migrant Entitlements and Services—imply 
that a one point increase in the aggregate score of the indices leads to an increase in 0.07, a de-
crease in 0.03 and a decrease in 0.03 percentage points in the share of FBUNS in the respective 
country samples. Consider then the effect of going from the lowest country score levels of the 
three indices (43 for Iran, 39 for Austria and 5 for United Arab Emirates, respectively) to the 
highest (85 for Australia, 88 for Sweden and 85 for Portugal, respectively). The sizable altera-
tions in integration policies would imply changes of 2.9 [42*(0.07)], -1.5 [49*(-0.03)] and -2.4 
[80*(-0.03)] percentage points in the share of FBUNS in the respective populations. These are 
relatively trivial effects for elephantine changes in immigration policies. In sum, even if we are 
willing to put aside concerns based on the lack of statistical significance, the absolute magni-
tudes of the negative point estimates arising in the exercises with stock data suggest that even 
considerable restrictions in the rights accorded to immigrants would generate at best relatively 
small changes in the number of migrants that could enter into these societies.  
 
All of the above results use a specification in which the share of FB is used as the dependent 
variable. Since the numbers versus rights hypothesis posits the existence of a trade-off rather 
than a strict causal relationship, it is unclear whether the correct specification to evaluate it 
should use the numbers or the rights indicator as the dependent variable. This is related to the 
different theories that are used to justify the hypothesis. The labor market demand hypothesis, 
which speculates that more extensive rights regimes will lead to a decline in the demand for for-
eign unskilled labor, seems to suggest a specification where the numbers are treated as the de-
pendent variable. In contrast, the political economy hypothesis, where voters will react to higher 
numbers of migrants by refusing to extend rights and entitlements to them, would seem to sug-
gest a specification where the rights are treated as the dependent variable.  
 
Columns (a), (c) and (e) in Table 9 below repeat the results of columns (c), (f) and (i) in Table 5 
using a specification where the composite scores for the three indices are the dependent variable. 
Putting rights on the left-hand side of the equation requires an alternative specification of the 
regression equation. The independent variables include the FBUNS, the log of per capita income 
in 2000, the level of democracy and a dummy for countries where more than 50% of the popula-
tion is catholic.
15
 Our choice of independent variables reflects the search for a basic characteriza-
tion of the type of country characteristics that may have an effect on the view of its populations 
towards issues related to rights and entitlements regimes. The coefficients—0.74, -0.76 and -
1.54, respectively—imply that a one point increase in the share of FBUNS in the population 
leads to an increase of 0.74 aggregate points in the Migrant Accessibility Index and a decline of 
0.76 and 1.54 aggregate points in the MIPEX and Migrant Entitlements and Services Indices. 
The effect of a dramatic increase in the percentage of FBUNS in the population—say five per-
cent, for example—would imply an increase of 3.7 [5*(0.74)] points in the Migrant Accessibility 
Index and a decline of 3.8 [5*(-0.76)] and 7.7 [5*(-1.54)] points in the MIPEX and Migrant En-
titlements and Services Indices. As in our earlier point estimates, we find that the absolute mag-
nitudes using the FBUNS as a specification suggest that even considerable increases in the share 
of FBUNS in selected OECD countries would generate at best relatively small changes in the 
rights accorded to those migrants. 
 
To overcome the evident limitation in trying to evaluate the numbers versus rights theory via 
simple cross-national correlations, we build on the specification where the aggregate scores for 
the three indices are used as the dependent variable. We then use the predicted share of immi-
grants from the gravity model by Cummins et al. (2009) to give us a purely exogenous variation 
in the foreign labor force.
16
 The instrumental variable results are presented below in columns (b), 
(d) and (f) in Table 9 alongside the OLS results from the previous exercise. Overall, we find a 
positive association between increasing rights and increasing numbers of FBUNS in selected 
OECD countries for all three indices, although none of the findings are significant at convention-
al levels.
17
 
 
                                                          
15
 Per capita income data comes from the WDI, the level of democracy is derived from the Polity IV Database (see 
Marshall and Jaggers, 2007) and Catholic countries are classified according to dioceses’ statistics as reported by 
Catholic Hierarchy (see http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/country/sc1.html). 
16
 In the gravity equation used for this exercise, the dependent variable is the log of migrant stock from country i 
living in country j divided by the population of country i. All stock values are derived from the University of Sus-
sex/World Bank Global Origin Migrant Database version 4. The independent variables include: log of weighted 
distance between countries, log of population for origin and destination countries, log of area for origin and destina-
tion countries, and a dummy variable for landlocked countries. 
17
 Regrettably, first stage tests indicate that our instrument is relatively weak, so these results must be read with 
caution. This weakness likely reflects the fact that in our sample the stock of FB—the variable predicted by the 
gravity model—is not always strongly correlated with FBUNS. 
Table 9: OLS and IV Results for Aggregate Scores as Dependent Variables 
 
Variable 
Migrant Accessi-
bility 
MIPEX Entitlements and 
Services (a) 
OLS 
(b) 
IV 
(c) 
OLS 
(d) 
IV 
(e) 
OLS 
(f) 
IV FBUNS ratio 0.735 2.554 -0.762 3.067 -1.543 8.446 
 
(1.12) (0.86) (0.6) (0.61) (0.92) (0.51) 
Log of income per 
cap 
-1.049 -8.73 14.201 -0.442 -0.093 -86.851 
 
(0.17) (0.62) (1.14) (0.02) (0) (0.58) 
Democracy  1.467 1.435 -0.864 -0.221 12.327 27.97 
 
(0.61) (0.51) (0.17) (0.03) (1.52) (0.89) 
Catholic dummy 0.029 2.272 -1.143 3.189 6.451 11.389 
 
(0.01) (0.41) (0.17) (0.32) (0.81) (0.56) 
Constant 59.096 128.209 -76.131 47.105 -50.034 634.09 
 
(1.06) (1.01) (0.57) (0.21) (0.28) (0.54) 
Observations 27 27 21 21 13 13 
R-squared 0.1  0.08 
 
0.55  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
The numbers versus rights hypothesis leads us to expect that we should observe a negative corre-
lation between the stock of migrants in a country and the inclusiveness of the rights accorded to 
them. The common comparison between GCC countries and Western democracies is often taken 
as illustrative of the existence of this trade-off. The presumed implication is that if Western de-
mocracies were able to restrict the rights accorded to immigrant populations they would be able 
to accept much higher numbers of immigrants. This, in turn, would result in a positive effect on 
many—if not all—dimensions of human development for those migrants that would be accepted.  
 
This paper has analyzed the empirical relationship between migrants’ rights and their numbers 
by using all available policy indices and distinct sources of migrant stock and flow data. Our 
results demonstrate that the data do not support the numbers versus rights hypothesis. Overall, 
we find an association of higher numbers and higher rights between the global and OECD coun-
try aggregate scores for all three indices and migrant stock data from UNDESA, the DIOC and 
the IMD. When examining the subcomponent scores of the migrants’ rights indices with FB data 
from the DIOC—our best FB estimate—this trend holds, as there is either a positive or zero rela-
tionship between increasing migrant stocks and afforded rights. Regression analyses of the data 
further reveal that the numbers versus rights tradeoff in immigration policy is not supported by 
empirical evidence. Here, an overall positive or zero relationship appears between increasing 
numbers and rights when using stock and flow data as dependent variables with other basic inde-
pendent variables, when looking at the percentage changes of FB inflows and MIPEX subcom-
ponent scores as dependent and independent variables, when moving rights to the left-hand side 
of the equation with a unique set of independent variables, and when instrumenting for FBUNS. 
 
Despite the cogent evidence that emerges from this analysis, two key limitations must be consi-
dered for future evaluations of the numbers versus rights hypothesis. First, the UNDESA and 
OECD FB datasets use the conventional definition of a migrant, which refers to those who are 
born in a foreign country.
18
 However, the immigrant-related policies that are measured by the 
various indices impact both the FB and second and higher generation migrants. Second, all three 
migrants’ rights indices use the term ―migrants‖ to refer to third country nationals legally resid-
ing in the country samples. The policy scores therefore reflect country-specific migration poli-
cies as they impact legal migrants. In practical terms, however, these indices may not be useful 
comparative tools in terms of analyzing policies as they relate to undocumented migrants, which 
account for up to a third of total migrants in some developed countries and may account for a 
larger number in developing countries.
19
  
 
While falling short of a clear indication of a positive correlation between the increasing stock of 
migrants and more inclusive rights, the evidence does not support the existence of a negative 
correlation as predicted by the numbers versus rights hypothesis. It warrants mentioning, howev-
er, that the measurement of integration policies is still at a nascent stage, and we may see signifi-
cant developments in the assessment of these policies in future years which, in turn, could lead 
us to reevaluate the conclusions presented in this paper. In any case, this exercise has shown that 
the existing data fails to present a strong prima facie case in favor of the numbers versus rights 
                                                          
18
 See UNDESA (2009) and OECD (2008).  
19
 See the discussion in chapter 2 of Human Development Report Office (2009b). 
hypothesis. The idea that countries have to choose between having higher migrants and restricted 
rights or greater rights and a reduced number of migrants does not find evident support from a 
configuration of the data in which a large number of countries that are more inclusive actually 
have higher fractions of migrants. 
 
Annex 1: Scatter Plots 
 
Graph 1: Foreign-born Populations in OECD Countries and the Migrant  
Accessibility Index  
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Graph 2: Foreign-born Populations in OECD Countries and the MIPEX 
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Graph 3: Foreign-born Populations in OECD Countries and Migrant Entitlements  
and Services Index 
 
 
  
MEX
JPN
TUR
ITA
ESP
PRT
GBR
DEU
FRA
SWE
USA CAN
AUS
MEX
JPN
TUR
ITA
ESP
PRT
GBR
DEU
FRA
SWE
USACAN
AUS
MEX
JPN
TUR
ITA
ESP
PRT
GBR
DEU
FRA
SWE
USACAN
AUS
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
- 5   10   15   20   25   30   
M
ig
ra
n
t 
E
n
ti
tl
em
en
ts
 a
n
d
 S
er
v
ic
es
 
S
co
re
s 
(2
0
0
9
)
% of Migrants in the Population (OECD, 2000 round of censuses)
total 
migrants
from 
developing
unskilled 
from 
developing
Linear 
(total 
migrants)
Linear 
(from 
developing)
Linear 
(unskilled 
from 
developing)
References 
 
Bell, Daniel and Nicola Piper (2005) ―Justice for Migrant Workers? The Case of Foreign Do-
mestic Workers in Hong Kong and Singapore,‖ In Multiculturalism in Asia, Eds. W. Kymlicka 
and H. Baogang, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 196-223. 
 
Carens, Joseph (2008) ―Live-in Domestics, Seasonal Workers, Foreign Students and others Hard 
to Locate on the Map of Democracy,‖ Journal of Political Philosophy 16(4): 419-445. 
 
Clemens, Michael, Claudio Montenegro and Lant Pritchett (2008), ―The Place Premium: Wage 
Differences for Identical Workers across the U.S. Border,‖ Center for Global Development 
Working Paper No. 148, available at http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/16352.  
 
Cummins, Matthew, Emmanuel Letouzé, Mark Purser and Francisco Rodríguez (2009) ―The 
Forces of International Migration: A Gravity Model Approach,‖ Human Development Research 
Paper No. 44, UNDP. 
 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2008) ―Global Migration Barometer: Methodology, Results and 
Findings,‖ available at http://corporate.westernunion.com/migration/wu_gmb_execsummary.pdf.   
 
Human Development Report Office (2009a) Migration Policy Assessment. 
 
Human Development Report Office (2009b) Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and devel-
opment. Forthcoming: Palgrave. 
 
Marshall, Monty and Keith Jaggers (2007) ―Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions, 1800-2007,‖ Version p4v2007, available at 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
 
Martin, Philip (2004) ―The United States: The Continuing Immigration Debate,‖ in Cornelius 
et al., Controlling Immigration, pp. 51-85. 
 Migrant Integration Policy Index (2007) British Council and Migration Policy Institute, available 
at http://www.integrationindex.eu/multiversions/2712/FileName/MIPEX-2006-2007-final.pdf.  
 
OECD (2009a) ―Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries,‖ available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/index.aspx?lang=en.  
 
OECD (2009b) ―International Migration Database,‖ available at 
http://stats.oecd.org/wbos/index.aspx?lang=en.  
 
OECD (2008) A Profile of Immigrant Populations in the 21st Century: Data from OECD Coun-
tries, OECD Publishing. 
 
Portes, Alejandro (2007) ―A Fence to Nowhere,‖ The American Prospect, October: 26-29, avail-
able at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_fence_to_nowhere. 
Pritchett, Lant (2006) Let Their People Come: Breaking the Gridlock on Global Labor Mobility, 
Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. 
 
Ruhs, Martin (2009) ―Migrants’ Rights, Immigration Policy and Human Development,‖ Human 
Development Research Paper No. 23, UNDP. 
 
Ruhs, Martin and Philip Martin (2008) ―Numbers vs Rights: Trade-offs and Guest Worker Pro-
grams,‖ International Migration Review 42(1): 249–265. 
 
UNDESA (2009) Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision. 
 
 
